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COPYRIGHT IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
AUTHORED WORKS*
John 0. Tresansky**
The Copyright Act of 19761 continues the prohibition enunciated in the
Copyright Act of 1909 against allowing copyright protection for certain
works which the Congress believes to serve the public interest best by be-
ing placed in the public domain.2 Section 105 of the current copyright
statute states, in part, that "[clopyright protection under this title is not
available for any work of the United States Government."3 The pertinent
part of its antecedent, section 8, read: "No copyright shall subsist. . . in
any publication of the United States Government, or any reprint, in whole
or in part, thereof."4
Although the language of these statutory prohibitions may appear to be
clear, diverse interpretations of the extent of the prohibition have been
continually voiced. As one court stated with reference to section 8: "The
precise scope of the phrase 'publication of the United States Government,'
has long been a source of conflict and concern, as a result of which many
* The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of his
agency.
** B.E.E., Catholic University 1950; L.L.B. Georgetown University 1954; Patent Coun-
sel, Goddard Space Flight Center; Distinguished Lecturer on Patent, Copyright and Trade-
mark Law, Catholic University; Secretary, American Patent Law Association.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (Supp.
III 1979)).
2. Ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077 (1909).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. III 1979). The entire provision states: "Copyright protection
under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the
United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights trans-
ferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise."
4. Ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077 (1909). The 1909 Act provided:
7. That no copyright shall subsist in the original text of any work which is in the
public domain, or in any work which was published in this country or any foreign
country prior to the going into effect of this Act and has not been already copy-
righted in the United States, or in any publication of the United States Govern-
ment, or any reprint, in whole or in part, thereof: Provided, however, That the
publication or republication by the Government, either separately or in a public
document, of any material in which copyright is subsisting shall not be taken to
cause any abridgement or annulment of the copyright or to authorize any use or
appropriation of such copyright material without the consent of the copyright pro-
prietor.
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definitions and criteria have been suggested for categorizing various works
as within or without the prohibition of the section."5
The language and legislative history of section 105 resolved many of the
uncertainties which arose in connection with section 8 of the prior act.6
The statutory definition of the expression "work of the United States Gov-
ernment" provided in section 101 of the current statute explicitly limits
the expression to a "work prepared by an officer or employee of the United
States Government as part of that person's official duties."7 Difficulties
arise, however, in interpreting the scope of the term "official duties" of
government personnel in specific situations. A situation in which this diffi-
culty frequently occurs is when a government employee, requested by a
publisher to write an article for a commercial periodical on some facet of
his assigned duties, writes the article during working hours.
Whether such an article is a "work of the United States Government" is
of great importance to the publisher of the commercial periodical. Under
section 201(c), the "[clopyright in each separate contribution to a collective
work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests
initially in the author of the contribution." 8 Absent an express transfer of
the copyright in the individual contribution by its author, the publisher's
copyright in the collective work extends only to the right of reproducing
and distributing copies of the contribution as part of the collective work
and not of the contribution alone.9 Thus, publishers desiring to acquire
the right to reproduce and distribute copies of individual articles apart
from the collective work must require each author of an article to execute
an assignment of the copyright therein to the publisher.'° Where the arti-
5. Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 297 F. Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
6. See Tresansky, Impact of the Copyright Act of 1976 on the Government, 27 FED. B. J.
22 (1978).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (Supp. III 1979).
9. Id.
10. Assignment is only one way of transferring copyright ownership. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (Supp. III 1979). The assignment must be contained in an instrument of conveyance,
note, or memorandum of transfer, which is signed by the owner of the interests conveyed or
an authorized agent. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (Supp. III 1979). A transfer of copyright ownership
need not be acknowledged or notarized, but such a certificate of acknowledgment can be
primafacie evidence of the execution of such a transfer. 17 U.S.C. § 204(b) (Supp. III 1979).
If the transfer occurs in the United States, the acknowledgment is only primafacie evidence
if issued by a notary or someone authorized to administer oaths in the United States. 17
U.S.C. § 204(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). When execution is in a foreign country, however, the
certificate must be issued by a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, or by a
person authorized to administer oaths whose authority is proved by a certificate of such
diplomatic or consular officer, in order to be considered prima facie evidence of a transfer.
17 U.S.C. § 204(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
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cle is a "work of the United States Government," however, an assignment
of copyright by the author is inappropriate because under section 105, the
article itself is not subject to a United States copyright. In addition, pub-
lishers of periodicals consisting preponderately of one or more works of
the United States government are required by section 403 to include in the
periodical's notice of copyright a statement identifying those portions of
the periodical in which copyright is claimed or, alternatively, unclaimed."
The purpose of such statement is to serve notice to the public of those
portions of the periodical which are in the public domain and, therefore,
free for use.
The difference in emphasis between the section 101 definition of a "work
of the United States Government" and the legislative history of section
105, as well as that of its predecessor, section 8, renders the applicability of
the copyright prohibition of section 105 more difficult. The statutory defi-
nition of the phrase emphasizes the scope of the author's employment,
while the legislative history of section 105 places the emphasis on the end
product. The House Judiciary Committee's discussion of the scope of the
prohibition of this section begins with the statement: "The basic premise
of section 105 of the bill is the same as that of section 8 of the present
law-that works produced for the U.S. Government by its officers and em-
ployees should not be subject to copyright."' 2 The emphasis here is clearly
on the entity for whom the work was written, and not on the circumstances
of writing. The House Report further notes in its discussion of section 105
that, under the section 101 definition of a government work, "a Govern-
ment official or employee would not be prevented from securing copyright
in a work written at that person's own volition and outside his or her du-
ties, even though the subject matter involves the Government work or
professional field of the official or employee."' 3
The congressional emphasis on the entity for whom the work was au-
thored is in accord with the legislative history of the copyright prohibition
in government publications. Section 8 of the Copyright Act of 1909 con-
tained the first legal prohibition in the copyright law against copyright in a
11. 17 U.S.C. § 403 (Supp. III 1979). Section 403 states:
Whenever a work is published in copies or phonorecords consisting preponder-
antly of one or more works of the United States Government, the notice of copy-
right provided by sections 401 or 402 shall also include a statement identifying,
either affirmatively or negatively, those portions of the copies or phonorecords em-
bodying any work or works protected under this title.
12. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1976), reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5671.
13. Id, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5672.
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government publication. 4 Preliminary drafts of the bill purported to in-
corporate in this provision the common law prohibition of copyright in
laws and judicial decisions, as well as the prohibition of copyright in gov-
ernment publications in the Printing Law of 1895. " Neither the hearings'6
nor the legislative reports' 7 on the Copyright Act of 1909 defines a publi-
cation of the United States government.' 8 The copyright prohibition of
the Printing Law of 1895-the first such statutory prohibition-suggests,
however, that the prohibition was intended to apply to any matter pre-
pared for the government. The Printing Law authorized the sale by the
Public Printer of "duplicate stereotype or electrotype plates from which
any Government publication is printed."' 9 To preclude private persons
from asserting copyright in republication of government documents from
the plates, the prohibition was added that "no publication reprinted from
such stereotype or electrotype plates shall be copyrighted."2 The Senate
Committee on Printing, in reviewing the applicability of the prohibition to
a congressman who attempted to republish a government publication, enti-
tled "Messages and Papers of the Presidents of the United States," from
such plates with a copyright notice in his name, stated:
[T]he prohibition contained in the Printing Act was intended to
cover every publication authorized by Congress in all possible
forms ...
Your committee thinks that copyright should not have been
issued in behalf of the Messages, and that the law as it stands is
sufficient to deny copyright to any and every work once issued as
a government publication. If the services of any author or com-
piler employed by the Government require to be compensated,
payment should be made in money, frankly and properly appro-
priated for that purpose, and the resulting book or other publica-
tion in whole and as to any part should be always at the free use
of the people, and this, without doubt, was what Congress in-
tended.
14. Ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077 (1909). The title on printing and documents, 44 U.S.C.
§ 505 (1976), previously contained the prohibition against copyrighting government publica-
tions. The 1978 amendment of this section deleted the copyright provision.
15. Ch. 23, § 52, 28 Stat. 608 (1895).
16. Hearings Before Joint Committee on Patents on S. 6330 and HR. 19853, 59th Cong.,
1st Sess. 133-35 (1906).
17. S. REP. No. 1108, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1909), reprinted in S. ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT LAW-BASIC AND RELATED MATER-
IALS (1956).
18. Ch. 23, § 52, 28 Stat. 608 (1895).
19. Id
20. Id
21. S. REP. No. 1473, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900), reprinted in Study No. 33, Copyrights
[Vol. 30:605
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If, therefore, the Printing Act of 1895 is considered to be a statute inpari
materia with the Copyright Act of 1909, the history of the former statute
may be properly viewed as indicating that the legislative intent of the pro-
hibition in the latter statute was to preclude a copyright in any work pre-
pared for printing by the United States government.
Section 105 of the Transitional and Supplementary provisions of the
Copyright Act of 1976 deleted the codification of the copyright prohibition
of the Printing Act.22 The commentary in the House Report on amend-
ments to other statutes states the intent thereof to be the repeal of the "ves-
tigial provision of the Printing Act dealing with the same subject" as
section 105 of the Copyright Act of 1976.23 It appears reasonable to con-
clude, therefore, that Congress viewed the copyright prohibition in the
copyright and printing statutes as being directed to works prepared for the
government.
The 196124 and 196525 Reports of the Register of Copyrights on studies
aimed at the general revision of the copyright law further emphasized the
importance of the entity for whom a work is prepared in determining
whether the prohibition against copyright protection applies. These stud-
ies were undertaken by the Copyright Office under the authorization of
Congress. The 1961 Report recommended retention of the prohibition of
copyright in "publications of the U.S. Government. 26 Moreover, the Re-
port recommended that this expression be defined as "works produced for
the Government by its officers or employees.",
27
in Government Publications by Caruthers Berger (Oct. 1959), prepared for the Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 30.
22. 44 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
23. House Report, supra note 12, at 5796.
24. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-
SION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1961).
25. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-
SION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN-
ERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1965).
26. See note 24, supra, at 133.
27. Id. The Report presented the following rationale for the copyright prohibition:
The legislative history of the initial prohibition in the Printing Law of 1895 indi-
cates that it was aimed at precluding copyright claims by private persons in their
reprints of Government publications. It was apparently assumed, without discus-
sion, that the Government itself would have no occasion to secure copyright in its
publications. Most Government publications at that time consisted of official docu-
ments of an authoritative nature. When the copyright laws were consolidated in
the Act of 1909, the same provision in substance was incorporated in that act. ...
The Federal Government today issues a great variety and quantity of informa-
tion material-technical manuals, educational guides, research reports, historical
reviews, maps, motion pictures, etc. The basic argument against permitting these
1981]
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The 1961 Report also acknowledged that much uncertainty existed
about the nature of a "publication of the U.S. Government." The Report
identified four possible meanings:
(a) It may refer to the work itself. In this sense a "Govern-
ment publication" would be any work produced by the Govern-
ment-that is, produced for the Government by its employees-
regardless of who published it.
(b) It may refer to the act of publishing copies of a work. In
this sense a "Government publication" would be any work pub-
lished by the Government, regardless of who produced it ...
(c) Any work which has either been produced or published by
the Government ...
(d) Only a work which has both been produced and published
by the Government. ..."
The Report proceeds to make the observation that "[t]he courts have ex-
pressed various opinions, but the weight of authority seems to point to the
first meaning: a work produced by the Government. ,29
The 1965 Report was a commentary on the copyright revision bill intro-
duced in the 89th Congress.3" The Report noted that in section 105 the bill
included the 1961 Report's recommendation to retain the copyright prohi-
bition in government publications and furthermore extended it to any
work of the United States government. 3 The Report also pointed out that
the 1961 Report proposed to include "published works produced for the
Government by its officers or employees" within the scope of the prohibi-
tion. Further, it stated that section 105 defined a "work of the United
States Government" as a "work prepared by an officer or employee of the
United States Government within the scope of his official duties or em-
ployment."32 The Report observed that under this definition:
[A] Government official or employee would not be prohibited
from obtaining copyright protection for any work he produces in
his private capacity outside the scope of his official duties. The
use of Government time, material, or facilities would not, of it-
self, determine whether something is a "work of the United
publications to be copyrighted is that any material produced and issued by the
Govermnent should be freely available to the public and open to the widest possi-
ble reproduction and dissemination.
Id. at 130.
28. Id at 130-31.
29. Id at 131.
30. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REC.1285 (1965). The Senate bill on
the same matter was S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Ill CONG. REC. 1226 (1965).
31. Supra note 25, at 8-9.
32. Id. at 9.
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States Government," but the Government would then have the
privilege of using the work in any event (28 U.S.C. § 1498(b)),
and the unauthorized use of Government time, material, or facil-
ity could, of course, subject an employee to disciplinary action.33
From the foregoing it appears that the Register of Copyrights inter-
preted the statutory copyright prohibition to apply to works authored by
government personnel for use by the United States government and not to
works authored for use by the private sector or to works with minor gov-
ernmental contribution to their preparation.
Prior to the enactment of legislation by Congress prohibiting copyright
in government works, the issue of whether copyrights could exist in judi-
cial decisions had been decided by the Supreme Court. In Wheaton v. Pe-
ters3 4 the issue was whether a reporter of court decisions, appointed under
an act of Congress, could assert a copyright in his published reports
against another who later published a book containing some of the re-
ported decisions. The Court determined that whatever copyright existed in
the reports was statutory and remanded the case for a determination of
whether compliance with the statutory provisions requisite to a valid copy-
right existed.35 The opinion concluded with the statement: "It may be
proper to remark that the court are unanimously of opinion, that no re-
porter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by
this court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any
such right.",36 If the Supreme Court had been of the opinion that no copy-
right could exist in the reports of the decisions, the remand would have
been without purpose. Thus, it may be assumed that the Court viewed
material contributed by the reporter, such as headnotes, statements of
facts, and arguments of counsel, as lawful subjects of copyright protection.
Subsequently, in Banks v. Manchester37 and Callaghan v. Myers,3 8 the
Court extended the prohibition against copyright to opinions of state
courts. In Callaghan, the Court held that the reporter was nevertheless
entitled to a copyright for his contribution to judicial opinions unless copy-
right was prohibited by statute. The Court reasoned that:
[T]here is no ground of public policy on which a reporter who
prepares a volume of law reports, of the character of those in this
case, can, in the absence of a prohibitory statute, be debarred
33. Id
34. 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
35. Id at 667-68.
36. Id at 668.
37. 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
38. 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
1981]
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from obtaining a copyright for the volume, which will cover the
matter which is the result of his intellectual labor.39
In all of these cases, the reports were prepared by individuals appointed
to their positions pursuant to legislative authority. The fact that reporting
of decisions constituted the official duty of the plaintiffs does not appear to
have influenced the Court.
The earliest case clearly involving the issue of whether a work prepared
by a government employee could be copyrighted is Heine v. Appleton.4
Heine, a professional artist, had been a member of the crew that accompa-
nied Admiral Perry to Japan and the China Seas. Although he was hired
as a master's mate, his chief duty was to make sketches and drawings for
the government. It was understood from the outset that all such works
would be the exclusive property of the government. Upon completion of
the expedition, the plaintiffs works were included in the official report on
the expedition. Later, Heine obtained a certificate of copyright in his
sketches and drawings. The court denied the plaintiffs right to copyright,
stating, "The sketches and drawings were made for the government, to be
at their disposal; and congress, by ordering the report, which contained
those sketches and drawings, to be published for the benefit of the public
at large, has thereby given them to the public."'" While there was an ex-
plicit understanding that the plaintiff's works were to be the exclusive
property of the government, this understanding arguably may have been
directed to the physical embodiment of the works and not to the individual
works contained in the report. The court's decision, however, was based
primarily on the consideration that the works were made for, and pub-
lished by, the government.
The first case to involve the applicability of the statutory copyright pro-
hibition in the Copyright Act of 1909 was Sherrill v. Grieves42 where the
plaintiff, an army captain, was assigned to teach a subject in an army
school. Because a suitable textbook for the course was not available, he
wrote one during his off-duty time. At the request of the army, he con-
sented to the incorporation of a considerable part of the material in a pam-
phlet which the army printed and distributed to students at the school.
The pamphlets bore a notice of copyright in the plaintiffs name. Subse-
quently, the material contained in the pamphlet was included in the book
that the plaintiff had been writing and which he also copyrighted. It was
the book that plaintiff alleged was infringed by the defendant's book. The
defendant contended that the plaintiffs copyrights were invalid because
39. Id at 647.
40. 11 F. Cas. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1857) (No. 6324).
41. Id at 1033.
42. 57 WASH. L. REP. 286 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1929).
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the material was a publication of the United States government. 3 In hold-
ing for the plaintiff, the court stated, inter alia, that the pamphlet "was not
a publication of the United States Government in the sense in which that
phrase is used in the statute."" The court rejected defendant's argument
that, although writing the subject material was not part of plaintiffs duties,
it was plaintiffs duty to provide the best possible treatment of the subject.
Thus, when he used the pamphlet to teach the class, it had to be assumed
that his superiors consented to the discharge of his duty in this manner.45
The court reasoned:
The plaintiff at the time was employed to give instruction just as
a professor in an institution of learning is employed. The court
does not know of any authority holding that such a professor is
obliged to reduce his lectures to writing or if he does so that they
become the property of the institution employing him 6
The court also stated that printing of the pamphlet by the army did not put
it in the "public domain," and that, even should the army's printing of the
pamphlet have been proper, it did not follow that the pamphlet became a
government document.47 The circumstances of printing and use of the
plaintiffs writing by the government did not persuade the court to con-
clude that the statute prohibited copyrighting of the plaintiffs pamphlet.
More recently, in Sawyer v. Crowell Publishing Co. ,48 the plaintiff, Exec-
utive Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, asserted copyright in a map
of Alaska. Upon returning from an official trip to Alaska, the plaintiff
directed a subordinate to assist him in preparing the map. The map was
prepared on government time using government materials and facilities as
well as information on file in the Department. The map was printed and
engraved by the Department bearing a copyright notice in plaintiffs name.
The map was later republished by the Department as an official publica-
tion with additional information and containing the copyright notice from
the original map.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the holding of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York that
"[t]he map was prepared as a result of and relating to the plaintiffs work
in Alaska in the course of his official duties."49 The district court observed
43. Id at 287.
44. Id at 290.
45. Id
46. Id
47. Id at 290-91.
48. 46 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aftd, 142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
735 (1944).
49. 142 F.2d at 498.
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that persuasive evidence existed to indicate that the map had been drawn
to stress Alaska's importance and the need for its development. This, the
court found, related directly to the subject matter of the plaintiffs work.
The court noted the large governmental contribution to the preparation of
the map, the initial intention for the map to be part of an official report,
and the government's publication of the map as an official document. The
plaintiffs consent to the government's publication of the map as an official
document as well as his failure to make any commercial use of the map
were also considered significant." In denying the plaintiffs right to a
copyright, the district court stated:
It is true that the mere fact that one has created or invented
something while in the employ of the government does not trans-
fer to it any title to or interest in it. But it is equally true that
when an employee creates something in connection with his du-
ties under his employment, the thing created is the property of
the employer and any copyright obtained thereon by the em-
ployee is deemed held in trust for the employer. . . . The evi-
dence is persuasive that this map was drawn to stress the
importance of Alaska, as well as the need for its development,
and this relates directly to the subject matter of the plaintiffs
work.
The most recent case to address the issue of whether a work authored by
a government employee is barred from copyright on the grounds that the
work is a publication of the United States government is Public Affairs
Associates, Inc. v. Rickover,52 decided by the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia on remand from the United States Supreme
Court. 3 In Public Affairs Associates, a navy admiral asserted copyrights in
speeches on education and on an experimental atomic power station which
he prepared and delivered to private organizations at their request. Dur-
ing that time, the admiral had technical responsibilities in nuclear propul-
sion plants for naval vessels and reactors, including the experimental
atomic power station which was the topic of one speech. The court evalu-
ated the question whether the speeches could be copyrighted as requiring a
resolution of the issue of whether they fell within the purview of the admi-
ral's official duties.54 Speechmaking, as the court noted, was not enumer-
ated among the author's official duties nor was he directed to make them.
55
50. 46 F. Supp. at 473.
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967).
53. 369 U.S. 111 (1962) (per curiam).
54. 268 F. Supp. at 448, 456.
55. Id at 448.
[Vol. 30:605
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The court reasoned, however, that this was not dispositive of the copyright
question because a high official has authority to act in a variety of ways not
enumerated in his formal position description. In this context, the duties
of a high government official should not be narrowly construed.56 The
court found that the preparation and delivery of the speeches was done
outside of working time57 and that the speeches were made in response to a
direct invitation to the admiral as a private individual.58 The final drafts,
however, were typed and reproduced by government personnel using gov-
ernment material and time, and, in the case of one of the speeches, also
served an official purpose.59 The court determined that the subject matter
of both speeches was far removed from the author's official duties.6 ° The
court concluded that the speeches were not a part of the admiral's official
duties and, therefore, were not "publications of the United States govern-
ment."" The copyrights in the speeches were upheld.
The principle of these cases is that a work authored by a government
employee for the use of the government cannot be the subject of a United
States copyright. A work, therefore, authored by a government employee
which can be considered as an assigned or expected duty cannot be pro-
tected by copyright. A work voluntarily authored by a government em-
ployee and not intended for use by the government, however, can be
protected by copyright. Thus, a copyright would exist in an article au-
thored by a government employee at the direct request of a publisher or
editor of a private publication, even though the article was written on gov-
ernment time and its content related to the author's official duties. In turn,
a copyright would not subsist in an article on a government agency's activ-
ities authored by the agency's public affairs officer and published in a com-
mercial periodical or in a work assigned by a superior to a government
employee which the employee prepared outside of working hours.
A narrow interpretation of the scope of the copyright prohibition is con-
sistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on owner-
ship of inventions made by government personnel. In one Supreme Court
case, United States v. Dubiier Condenser Corp. ,62 the government sued for
a declaration of government ownership of patents granted to two physicists
56. Id. at 448-49.
57. Id at 449, 452.
58. Id
59. Id at 447.
60. Id. at 449. The atomic power plant speech was so viewed because its contents were
aimed at administrators and not scientists,
61. Id at 456.
62. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
1981]
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employed in the radio division of the National Bureau of Standards. The
physicists belonged to a group engaged in research and testing of radios for
aircraft. The patented inventions related to the use of alternating current
to operate a radio receiver and a power amplifier for a dynamic type
speaker. The evidence established that these projects were not involved in
the projects assigned to the group, but rather were voluntarily assumed by
the inventors.63 In addition, the projects were pursued during working
hours using government material and equipment with permission of their
superiors.64 In holding that the inventions were owned by the employees
because they were not made as part of their employment, the Court stated:
One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his
term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to
his employer any patent obtained. The reason is that he has only
produced that which he was employed to invent. His invention is
the precise subject of the contract of employment. A term of the
agreement necessarily is that what he is paid to produce belongs
to his paymaster. On the other hand, if the employment be gen-
eral, albeit it cover a field of labor and effort in the performance
of which the employee conceived the invention for which he ob-
tained a patent, the contract is not so broadly construed as to
require an assignment of the patent.65
One must acknowledg that the ultimate results differ greatly between a
determination that an invention made by a government employee is a part
of the employee's official duties and a determination that work authored
by a government employee is within the scope of the employee's official
duties. In the former, title to the invention belongs to the government. In
the latter, the work is in the public domain. The analogy between inven-
tions and written works, however, is appropriate because of the common
constitutional genesis of patent and copyright law.66 Such analogies were
considered by the courts in Sawyer6 7 and in the initial decision in Public
63. Id at 184-85.
64. Id at 185.
65. Id at 187 (citations omitted). In Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886), the Court
held that an employee under contract to devise improvements in plows for his employer, a
manufacturer of plows, was not a trustee of a patent for his employer. Similarly, in Stan-
dard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924), the court reasoned that where one was employed
to develop machines, and was compensated for such services, the improvements developed
by the employee properly belonged to his employer.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 reads: "The Congress shall have Power... to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
67. 142 F.2d at 499.
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Affairs Associates,6 although the former case adopted the principles of
ownership of employee invention stated in Dubilier Condenser.69
The plain language of the Copyright Act of 1976 does not clarify fully
the ambiguities of earlier court decisions. The House Report's commen-
tary on section 105 includes a statement which contributes to the uncer-
tainty about the scope of the copyright prohibition. The Report states:
"Although the wording of the definition of 'work of the United States
Government' differs somewhat from that of the definition of 'work made
for hire,' the concepts are intended to be construed in the same way."
70
A literal interpretation of this statement would lead to conflicts between
the various statutory provisions governing these kinds of works. Initially,
while section 105 provides that a copyright cannot exist in a work of the
United States government, 71 section 201(b) provides that the author of a
work made for hire is the employer, or other person for whom the work is
prepared, and section 201(a) provides that the copyright in a work initially
vests in the author.72 Secondly, section 201 (b) provides that this "statutory
authorship" may be avoided by the parties' express written agreement to
the contrary.7 3 No such "exemption" is provided for the copyright prohi-
bition in a work of the United States government. Finally, the definitions
of "work of the United States Government"74 and "work made for hire
' 75
68. 177 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D.D.C. 1959), rev'd, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated
and remanded, 369 U.S. 111 (1962), opinion on remand, 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967).
69. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
70. Supra note 12, at 58, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5672.
.71. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) & (b) (Supp. III 1979). The two provisions state:
(a) Initial ownership
Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or
authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the
work.
(b) Works made for hire
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them,
owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
73. See note 72 supra.
74. Section 101 states in pertinent part: "A 'work of the United States Government' is a
work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that
person's official duties." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979).
75. Section 101 defines "work made for hire" as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a col-
lective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a transla-
tion, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test,
as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
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set forth in section 101 differ significantly because the former expression is
limited to government personnel while the latter expression includes both
employees and independent contractors on special order or commission. It
would seem evident from the foregoing that the full significance of the
analogy is unclear.
In Scherr v. Universal Match Corp. ,76 decided under the prior copyright
statute, the "work made for hire" concept was applied to a work authored
by government personnel. In this case two ex-servicemen asserted a copy-
right in a statue which they had sculptured while in the army. The district
court rejected the defense that the work was not copyrightable because it
was a publication of the government on the rationale that "there seems to
be unanimous, albeit tacit, agreement that 'publications of the United
States Government' refers to printed works."77 The district court held for
the defendant, however, on the ground that whatever copyright existed in
the work belonged to, or inured to the benefit of, the government because
the statue was a work for hire.78 In affirming the judgment of the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, but explicitly leaving unde-
cided the ruling that the statue was not a government publication, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit identified the factors which it con-
sidered determinative of whether the "work for hire" doctrine applied:
The essential factor in determining whether an employee cre-
ated his work of art within the scope of his employment as part of
his employment duties is whether the employer possessed the
right to direct and to supervise the manner in which the work was
being performed. Other pertinent, but non-essential, considera-
tions, are those indicating at whose insistence, expense, time and
facilities the work was created. Additionally, the nature and
amount of compensation or the absence of any payment received
by the employee for his work may be considered; but when com-
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a
work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author
for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, com-
menting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords,
afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical ar-
rangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and
an "instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publica-
tion and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979).
76. 297 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd.417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 936 (1970).
77. 297 F. Supp. at 110.
78. Id at 112.
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pared with the above factors it is of minor relevance.79
Under this test, the court concluded that an employer-employee relation-
ship existed between the government and the servicemen, and any owner-
ship of copyright in the statue belonged to the government.8" The court
noted such factors as the army's power to supervise the servicemen on the
project, appropriation of government funds, time and facilities to the pro-
ject as well as the fact that the statue was created pursuant to a formal
government-commissioned project.8' No conflict was considered to exist
between the legislative history of the prohibition or the test applied in the
determination of a "work made for hire" in this case and the tests applied
in the prior cases to determine whether the statutory copyright prohibition
applied to a work prepared by government personnel because it was part
of their official duties.82
Finally, the House Report's commentary on the "works made for hire"
provision of section 201 noted that this approach was adopted rather than
the "shop right" approach of patent law under which the employee keeps
title to his work but the employer generally acquires the right to use the
employee's work to the extent needed for purposes of the employer's regu-
lar business. 83 As the reasoning for this choice, the Report explained:
The pesumption [sic] that initial ownership rights vest in the em-
ployer for hire is well established in American copyright law, and
to exchange that for the uncertainties of the shop right doctrine
would not only be of dubious value to employers and employees
alike, but might also reopen a number of other issues.84
This statement may be viewed as casting a cloud on the "Government
shop right" provision. Under this statute, a copyright owner may sue the
government for an infringement of a copyright which had been authorized
and consented to by the government. This right to sue the government
explicitly applies to employees of the government except where an em-
ployee is in a position to order, influence, or induce the government's use
of the copyrighted work.86 However, this right to sue the government is
expressly denied by the statute to
any copyright owner or any assignee of such owner with respect
79. 417 F.2d at 500-01 (citations omitted).
80. Id at 501.
81. Id
82. Id.
83. See note 12, supra at 121, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5736-37.
84. Id, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5737.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (Supp. III 1979).
86. Id.
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to any copyrighted work prepared by a person while in the em-
ployment or service of the United States, where the copyrighted
work was prepared as a part of the official functions of the em-
ployee, or in the preparation of which Government time, mate-
rial, or facilities were used.87
The latter portion, "or in the preparation of which Government time, ma-
terial, or facilities were used," is considered to create a "Government shop
right" in works authored by government personnel outside of their official
duties but with a contribution by the government.88 This "Government
shop right" exists despite the comment to the contrary in the House Judici-
ary Committee's discussion of section 201. 9 Supportive of this view is the
statement in the 1965 Copyright Register's Report: "The use of Govern-
ment time, material, or facilities would not, of itself, determine whether
something is a 'work of the United States Government,' but the Govern-
ment would then have the privilege of using the work in any event (28
U.S.C. § 1498(b))." 90 Also supportive of this view is section 105(c) of the
Transitional and Supplementary provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976
which merely changed a cross reference in section 1498(b) without altering
the operative provision of section 1498(b), the "Government shop right"
provision. 9 1
In sum, neither the case law nor the legislative history of the statutory
prohibition of a copyright in works authored by government personnel
warrants a broad interpretation of section 105. To interpret this provision
more broadly than is clearly required to carry out its underlying public
purpose would unnecessarily vitiate the government officer's and em-
ployee's incentive to intellectual creativity provided by Congress in the
Copyright Law pursuant to the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
87. Id
88. See notes 83-84 and accompanying text supra.
89. Supra note 25, at 9.
90. Id.
91. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
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